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UNITED STATES V. JONES: CHANGING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL

AGE
Daniel W. Edwards*
"It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.' I

Does the legitimate expectation of privacy contained in the Fourth Amendment retreat
as technology advances and becomes publicly available? The Supreme Court in United States
v. JoneS 2 attempted to answer the question as it relates to GPS monitoring.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.3
The Amendment thus does three things: it provides what is protected, "persons, houses,
papers, and effects"; it protects the people from "unreasonable searches and seizures"; and it
mandates the requirements for warrants. 4 The issue in Jones was only whether the individual was
protected under the Fourth Amendment from GPS monitoring when the device is placed on a
personal automobile, not whether, if it is protected, a warrant or a particular degree of
reasonableness was required.5
I.

THE PRE-KATZ6 STANDARD: INVASION OF A PERSON, HOUSE, PAPER, OR EFFECT

Early cases required some type of trespass to create a Fourth Amendment issue. Not only
was a trespass required, but the item had to be specifically the person, the physical place of the
person's dwelling, the person's papers, or the person's effects. In Hester v. United States, the
Court found no Fourth Amendment violation when government agents observed the defendant
from fifty to one hundred yards away, though they were on Hester's land. 7 The agents recovered
certain items of evidence, including broken bottles that were found to contain illegal whiskey. 8
The Court found no illegality in the viewing or the retrieval of the whiskey bottles, holding that,

Adjunct Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver, teaching in the areas of Evidence, Criminal
Procedure, and Trial Practice since 1988. Practitioner of criminal law in Colorado as a public defender,
criminal defense attorney, and prosecutor since 1977.
1
2

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947-52 (2012).

3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4

Id.

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947-53.
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See discussion infra Section II.
7 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924).
5

6 Katz

8 Id. at 58.
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although there was a trespass, there was no illegal search or seizure because it did not involve
the defendant's "person, house, papers, or effects." 9
One of the first cases involving the interplay of the Fourth Amendment and advancing
technology concerned the invention of the telephone. In Olmstead v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that the interception of private telephone conversations between the
defendant and others did not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation: 10

.

The well-known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against
general warrants and writs of assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental
force to search a man's house, his person, his papers, and his effects, and to
prevent their seizure against his will.. .
The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things - the
person, the house, his papers, or his effects.11
The Court held that there were no searches and no seizures involved in wiretapping,
accomplished outside of the defendant's homel 2:

.

The language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include
telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or
office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more than are
the highways along which they are stretched.. .
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that
the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 13
Thirty years later the Court addressed the issue of electronic recordings of conversations
within a dwelling in Silverman v. United States. 14 There, the government used an electronic
listening device attached to an extension, attaching it next to a heating duct in a dwelling,
"thus converting their entire heating system into a conductor of sound." 15 The Court explained,
"We need not here contemplate the Fourth Amendment implications of these and other
frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon
human society." 16 The Court found that there was actual penetration into the dwelling and thus
a Fourth Amendment violation.I Silverman continued the notion that there had to be a physical
intrusion to constitute a search or seizure. 18 The decision rested upon the notion that there was
"an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." 19

9 Id. at 58-59.
10 277 U.S. 438, 466-67 (1928).
ii

Id. at 463-64.

12 Id.

Id. at 465-66.
14 365 U.S. 505, 506-08 (1961).
15 Id. at 506-07
i6 Id. at 509.
17 Id. at 509-13.
is /d. at 508-13.
9
i /d. at 512.
13
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THE KATz STANDARD: LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

Finding the earlier cases unsatisfactory in resolving evolving Fourth Amendment issues,
the Court in Katz v. United StateS 20 rejected the "physical trespass" theory in favor of a
"legitimate expectation of privacy" test. 2 1 The Court dismissed any formulation of the issue
focused on "constitutionally protected areas" as "misleading" 2 2:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 23
The Court held that an individual who entered a public phone booth and closed the
door was protected by the Fourth Amendment, even though there was no physical trespass to
the telephone booth by the government's placement of a listening device on the outside of the
booth.24 An individual entering into a phone booth and closing a door has demonstrated a
desire to maintain personal privacy.2 5 Society has the expectation that when a person enters a
phone booth and closes the door, his privacy should be respected. 26 The combination of what
the individual did to protect his own privacy and what society was willing to protect created an
interest that was protected by the Fourth Amendment. 27 Justice Harlan in his concurrence
created the paradigm that was adopted in 1967 and in effect to this day: a subjective
expectation of privacy based on the person's conduct plus an objective expectation of privacy
based on what is recognized by society as a reasonable expectation of privacy equals a
legitimate expectation of privacy that the courts are willing to protect. 28
After
determined
extension of
interference

Katz, for Fourth Amendment purposes, whether there is a "search" or "seizure" is
by reference to a legitimate expectation of privacy. 29 Thus, a "search" is an
the senses into a legitimate expectation of privacy. A "seizure" is an intrusion into or
with a legitimate expectation of privacy.30

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21 See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (recognizing that Katz overruled Olmstead).
22 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
23 Id. (internal citations omitted).
24 Id. at 352-53.
25 Id. at 352.
26 Id. at 353.
27 Id. at 352-53.
28 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 151 (1978) ("Only legitimate expectations of privacy are protected
by the Constitution.').
30 E.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119-20 (1984) (finding that a Drug Enforcement
Administration agent's search of a damaged cardboard box discovered by employees of a private freight
carrier "infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy and hence was not a 'search' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment').
20

DANIEL W. EDWARDS

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2012

28
3

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW PCEVIEW

III.

SPRING 2012

UNITED STATES V. JONES 31 : LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY PLUS INVASION OF A POSSESSORY
INTEREST

Without question, advancing technology has the power to reduce citizens' Fourth
Amendment right to privacy by bringing invasive applications into general public use. In United
States v. Jones, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, attempts to stem the tide of
advancing technology, in particular GPS monitoring, by re-installing a Fourth Amendment
prohibition against invasion of a possessory interest while leaving in place the legitimate
expectation of privacy test that was introduced in Katz. 32 By including in the definition of a
search an invasion of a possessory interest in a protected place ("persons, houses, papers, and
effects") to obtain information, the Court determined that GPS monitoring that included the
installation of a device on a defendant's car was a "search" that required either a warrant or a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 33
Antoine Jones was the focus of an investigation by a joint task force of the FBI and
Metropolitan Police Department for the District of Columbia. 34 Officers watched Jones by the
use of visual observation, pen registers, and wiretaps. 35 Law enforcement placed a GPS monitor
on Jones's personal vehicle. 36 The government tracked the vehicle 24 hours a day, seven days a
week, for the next 28 days.37 The monitor relayed over 2,000 pages of data. 38 Using the data
from the monitoring, law enforcement searched a conspirator's house that contained $850,000
and 97 kilograms of cocaine. 39 The defendant was indicted. 40 The defendant filed a motion to
suppress the data from the GPS monitoring. 41 The district court granted the motion in part,
suppressing only the information gathered while the Jones's car was parked in his private
garage. 42 After the first trial ended with a hung jury, the government got a second indictment,
held a second trial using the same GPS information allowed in the first, and won a guilty verdict;
the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. 43 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the conviction, holding that the GPS monitoring, even outside the garage,
violated the Fourth Amendment. 44
Justice Scalia, always an originalist,45 held for the Court that "[a]t bottom, we must
'assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.'"46 At oral argument, the Justice stated:

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 949-950; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
34 Id. at 947.
31

32

35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38

Id.
39 Id. at 948-949.
40

Id. at 948.

41

Id.

42 Id.

Id. at 948-49.
44 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (2010).
45 An "originalist" interprets the Constitution 'according to the intent of those who drafted and adopted
it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (9th ed. 2009). Justice Scalia is a self-described originalist. E.g., 60
Minutes:Justice Scalia on the Record (CBS television broadcast Feb. 11, 2009), available
athttp://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-4040290.html?pageNum=7.
46 Jones, 132 S. Ct at 950 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
43
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However, it is one thing to add that privacy concept to the Fourth Amendment
as it originally existed, and it is quite something else to use that concept to narrow
the Fourth Amendment from what it originally meant. And it seems to me that
when that device is installed against the will of the owner of the car on the car,
that is unquestionably a trespass and thereby rendering the owner of the car not
secure is his effects - the car is one of his effects - against an unreasonable
search and seizure. 47
To make Justice Scalia's position clear, two principles apply in determining whether there
has been a search for Fourth Amendment purposes: first, a trespass into a possessory interest of a
protected place to gather information, and second, the "legitimate expectation of privacy"
principle originating in Katz. 48 Here, the GPS monitor was placed on a personal automobile-an
invasion into a possessory interest. 49 Justice Scalia found that the automobile was an "effect,"
and thus a protected place.50 The Court further held that "the government's installation of a GPS
device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements,
constitutes a 'search.'" 5 1 For Justice Scalia, the issue was whether the placement of the monitor
invaded the Fourth Amendment protection afforded Jones; the actual monitoring of Jones'
vehicle while on public streets was permissible by clear Supreme Court precedent. 52
Duration, a key issue for the concurrence of Justice Alito, 53 was not an issue for Justice
Scalia, who stated in oral argument:
A hundred times zero equals zero. If ... there is no invasion of privacy for one day,
there's no invasion of privacy for a hundred days. Now, it may be unreasonable
police conduct, and we can handle that with laws. But if there's no invasion of
privacy, no matter how many days you do it, there's no invasion of privacy.54
Justice Alito, with three Justices joining his opinion, rejected the re-establishment of the
pre-Katz "invasion of a possessory interest" principle, but agreed that there was a Fourth
Amendment violation because citizens have a legitimate expectation of privacy from lengthy
GPS monitoring.5 5 Justice Alito, citing Supreme Court precedent for the notion that a "seizure"
exists when there is a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that
property,"5 6 found that there was no Fourth Amendment seizure in Jones because no
"meaningful interference" was caused by the placement of the monitor on the automobile.5 7 "It
is clear that the attachment of the GPS device was not itself a search . . . ."5 8

Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, United States v. Jones, 2011 WL 5360051 (2011) (No. 10-1259), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/10-1259.pdf.
48 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-950.
47

49

Id. at 947.

Id. at 949.
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
52 Id. at 951-952 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
53
Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
5o
51

54 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-41, United States v. Jones, 2011 WL 5360051 (2011) (No. 10-1259),

available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/10-1259.pdf.
55
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957, 961-962, 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
56 /d. at 958 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
57

Id.

58

d.
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The Jones case left unanswered much more than it solved. It told us that the placement
of a GPS monitor upon an individual's automobile is a Fourth Amendment search because it
invades a possessory interest of a constitutionally protected item to obtain information. What it
did not do is establish any helpful standard for assessing the impact of developing technology
on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the future.
IV.

"GENERAL PUBLIC USE"

Cases pre-dating Jones held that as technology comes in general public use, the
objective expectation of privacy is reduced and, therefore, no legitimate expectation of
privacy exists. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,5 9 the Court held that aerial photographs of
a chemical company's industrial complex were not a search, even though the camera used is
described in the dissent as a "$22,000 mapping camera." 6 0 The opinion of the Court discussed
the camera by saying:
Here, EPA was not employing some unique sensory device that, for example
could penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversations in Dow's plants,
offices, or laboratories, but rather a conventional, albeit precise, commercial
camera commonly used in mapmaking....
It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of private
property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally
available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutional
proscribed absent a warrant. But the photographs here are not so revealing of
intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. 61
Fifteen years later, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court addressed the issue of thermal
imaging of a dwelling. 62 Justice Scalia, for the Court, held that "[w]here, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search'
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." 63 Both Dow Chemical and Kyllo thus
based their holdings on whether the technology was generally available to the public. The cases
suggest that when the general public can purchase the technology for a non-exorbitant
amount, the objective expectation of privacy has been reduced.
With general public use in mind, there is now an expressed concern about advanced
technology becoming increasingly affordable and available to the general public. Justice
Sotomayor, concurring in Jones, stated, "[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and
community hostility.'" 64 Justice Alito, in a separate concurrence, stated, "Devices like the one
used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap." 65 The
implication, contrary to "general public use" reducing the objective expectation of privacy, is

s9 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
60 Id. at 250 n.12 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
61 Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
62 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001).
63 Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
64 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
65 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
DANIEL W. EDWARDS
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that availability for general public use is something to be avoided, something that society needs
to protect against. It is an outright rejection of the "general public use" principle.
The "general public use" doctrine, however, fits well within the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis. To have an objective expectation of privacy, one that society
recognizes, courts look to see what private citizens can do.66 In Dow Chemical, the Court found
a $22,000 camera to be "generally available to the public" even though, while cameras in
general were available to the public, a $22,000 camera in 1986 certainly was not. 67 A recent
check of thermal imager pricing indicates that they can be purchased for as low as $4,000 and
rented for as little as $125 per day. 68 GPS tracking devices are available to the public for as low
as $138.95 used and $199.95 new. 69 If the test is general public use, these prices indicate at least
general public availability. The Court has only two choices: either the test as articulated in Dow
Chemical and Kyo creates a reduction in the objective expectation of privacy for thermal
imaging and GPS tracking or the "general public use" doctrine must be rejected for some yetto-be-articulated test incorporating the idea that the very affordability and availability of certain
technology actually counts against its acceptability for Fourth Amendment purposes.
V.

LENGTH OF TIME AS A POSSIBLE GOVERNING PRINCIPLE

According to the principle adopted by five of the Justices-Justice Alito, concurring and
joined by three other Justices, and Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence-the length of time
GPS monitoring continues may constitute an infringement on a legitimate expectation of
privacy. 70 While hoping for legislative action, Justice Alito stated, "The best that we can do in this
case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking
in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
anticipated."7 1 Justice Alito makes a distinction between "short-term monitoring," that society
recognizes as reasonable, and "longer term GPS monitoring," which "impinges on expectations
of privacy." 72 The Justice then, without creating a workable principle, went on to state that the
precise point in time where the longer-term monitoring becomes a search "was surely crossed
before the 4-week mark." 73
To make Justice Alito's position clear, the attachment of the GPS monitoring device is not
itself a search or seizure because that action is de minimus; the short-term monitoring is not an
invasion of objective expectations of privacy, but long-term monitoring is an invasion of a
legitimate expectation of privacy. The issue for Justice Alito is not the placement of the monitor,
See generally id., 132 S. Ct. 945; Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27; Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. 227.
Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 251 n.13; see also U.S. Census Bureau, Table H-8, Median Household Income by
State: 1984 to 2010 (2010), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/ household/ (follow
"Table H-8. Median Household Income by State' link) (listing the median U.S. household income in 1986 as
$24,897).
68 AMERICAN INFRARED, http://www.americaninfrared.com/home.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (new and used
FLIR infrared cameras priced between $4,000 and $11,000); TESTEQUITY,
66

67

http://www.testequity.com/products/1661/#price (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (Fluke Til0 thermal imager
priced as low as $4,495); AJAx ENVIRONMENTL AND SAFETY SUPPLY, INC., http://www.thermalcamerarentals.com/flir-

i-series-cameras-i40i50i60.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (thermal camera rentals for $125 per day and $350
per week).
69 BRICKHOUSE SECURITY, http://www.brickhousesecurity.com/covert-small-gps-tracking-device.htm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2012) (listing a police-grade, hardwired GPS vehicle tracking system for $349.00); GPSCORNER.US,
http://gps-vehicle-monitoring.gpscorner.us/(last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (GPS tracking unit listed from $199.99).
70
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 964.
72

Id.

73 Id.
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which is not a constitutional violation under his analysis, but the length of the monitoring, which is
a constitutional violation.
Certainly the Court knows how to impose specific time limits, as it has done so in the past.
For example, the Court imposed a 48-hour time limit for a probable cause finding of a
defendant who is detained for a crime in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 74 and in Maryland v.
Shatzer a 14-day break in custody was declared sufficient to permit law enforcement to try to
interrogate a suspect again after the suspect's assertion of a right to counsel. 7 Arguably, then,
the Court could create a time limit for such infringements of privacy as GPS monitoring. Justice
Alito chose not to suggest or even hint at any such limit. 76
Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Alito that duration was an important
consideration in determining whether there was a legitimate expectation of privacy: "[A]t the
very least, longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy."77 But Justice Scalia criticized the duration theory, saying it "leads us
needlessly into additional thorny problems." 7 8 Specifically, Justice Scalia points to the lack of any
reasoned principle that would guide the Court in distinguishing between short-term and longterm monitoring.79
Can time limits actually protect the expectation of privacy? It seems unlikely anyone
would support a rule saying police may enter my dwelling on a whim as long as they remain only
five minutes, or may search my car without any level of suspicion or a warrant for ten minutes,
but not for eleven. Such examples seem to illustrate that rigid time limitations, though perhaps
workable in other areas, are simply inappropriate in a Fourth Amendment context. Or as Justice
Scalia put it at oral arguments, "if there is no invasion of privacy for one day, there's no invasion
of privacy for a hundred days." 80 Whether or not an action violates the Fourth Amendment has
nothing to do with "how many days you do it."81
VI.

THE "CONTENT EXCEPTION" AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO ELECTRONIC MESSAGING

Justice Sotomayor, in her concurrence, suggested that "[m]ore fundamentally, it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties." 82 The Court has protected the content of
letters but not the address and return address, 83 the content of telephone calls but not the
numbers dialed, 84 and refused to protect bank records by the Fourth Amendment because that
information was made available to third parties. 85 "This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course
of carrying out mundane tasks." 86
500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
75 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010).
76 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
77 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78 Id. at 954.
74

79 Id.

so Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-41, United States v. Jones, 2011 WL 5360051 (2011) (No. 10-1259),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/10-1259.pdf.
81

Id.

Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
83 See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
84 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-46 (1979), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
8s United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976), superseded by statute, Financial Privacy Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641.
86
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
82
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Lower courts have discussed what is called the "content exception" to information that
might be revealed through law enforcement surveillance. 87 The exception finds its roots in Ex
parte Jackson, a case holding that while the outside of a letter, i.e. mailing and return addresses,
was available to the public, the contents of the letter itself remained protected. 88 In Smith v.
Maryland, the Court held that a pen register installed on telephone company property was not
a Fourth Amendment search. 89 The Court noted that pen registers, which simply record the
number that is dialed, do not acquire the contents of the communications. 90 The Court found no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers being dialed because the public was aware
that those numbers would be recorded and kept by the telephone company as a matter of
course.9 1 The location from which the calls were made, in that case from within the defendant's
home, was found to be irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. 92 The Court noted that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information that he turns over voluntarily to
third parties. 93 The content of the telephone conversation itself, however, remained protected. 94
Recently, a federal district court addressed the release of cell phone records in In re U.S.
for an Order Authorizing the Re/ease of Historical Cell-Cite Information. 95 The court noted:
[C]ellular service providers have records of the geographic location of almost
every American at almost every time of day and night....
What does this mean for ordinary Americans? That at all times, our physical
movements are being monitored and recorded, and once the Government can
make a showing of less-than-probable cause, it may obtain these records of our
movements, study the map [of] our lives, and learn the many things we reveal
about ourselves through our physical presence. 96
The government sought release of this information under the Stored Communications
Act, which only requires "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication ... are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 97 Or stated another way, reasonable suspicion.
Instead of analyzing the request under the statute, the Court considered the Fourth Amendment
and ultimately held that the government was required to obtain a warrant on the basis of
probable cause. 98 "The fiction that the vast majority of the American population consents to
warrantless government access to the records of a significant share of their movements by
'choosing' to carry a cell phone must be rejected."9 9

87 See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122-25
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing how federal courts apply the "content exception').
88 Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
89 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
90
Id. at 741.
91 Id. at 742.
92 Id. at 743.
93 Id. at 743-44.
94

See id. at 741.
95 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
96

Id.

97 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98
Id. at 127.
99 Id.
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The Sixth Circuit adopted the "content exception" to emails in United States v. Warshak,
holding that a warrant based upon probable cause was required to compel a commercial
Internet service provider to turn over the contents of emails. 100 In United States v. Forrester, the
Ninth Circuit discussed surveillance of to/from addresses on e-mails, the IP addresses of websites
visited, and the total amount of data transmitted to or from an account. 101 The court held that
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in those matters that "are voluntarily turned
over in order to direct the third party's servers." 102 The to/from addresses from emails and IP
addresses were found to be addressing information, analogized to a letter, and did not concern
the content of the messages. 103 The court held that there was a clear line between addressing
information and content that was not violated by the government in that particular case. 104
Elsewhere, the Ninth Circuit has held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
text messages that are stored on the service provider's network, 105 and case law is slowly
developing that finds a reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's cell phones and
information stored on them, including text messages. 106 In State v. Clampitt, for example, the
Missouri Court of Appeals stated that "society's continued expectation of privacy in
communications made by letter or phone call demonstrates its willingness to recognize a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of text messages."10 7
Could the "content exception" have applied in Jones? In order to protect an individual's
privacy from government invasion, the Court would have to overrule the beeper cases that held
that monitoring a beeper while the beeper was on public roads was not an invasion of
privacy. 108 Those holdings only required a logical step from law enforcement physically following
a civilian in public to the monitoring of a person in public by use of a beeper. That progression
arguably leads to the conclusion that GPS monitoring in a public place is not a violation of a
legitimate expectation of privacy. In this case, however, applying the "content exception,"
while the placement of a monitor on the car would not be a constitutional violation, revealing
information about the defendant's travel would be.

100 631 F.3d 266, 287-88 (6th Cir. 2010).
ioi
02
1
03

1

512 F.3d 500, 509-11 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 510.
Id. at 511.

104 Id.
105 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (where the Supreme Court assumed that there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy without deciding the issue).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding defendant "had a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding this information"); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007)
(finding "a reasonable expectation of privacy in the call record and text messages on the cell phone");
United States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2011) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy
in personal cell phones, including call records and text messages); United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d
1134, 1140 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phones because "the weight
of authority agrees that accessing a cell phone's call log or text message folder is considered a 'search' for
Fourth Amendment purposes"); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(requiring a search warrant "to search the contents of a cell phone unless an exception to the warrant
requirement exists"); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information cell phones contain because of their multi-functional uses and storage of large
amounts of private data, including text messages).
107 State v. Clampitt, No. WD 73943, 2012 WL 177394, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012).
108 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
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FREQUENCY OF CONDUCT AS GUIDING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY

In Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court concerned itself with the issue of how a legitimate
expectation of privacy was to be determined. 109 Riley lived in a mobile home in a rural location
with a partially enclosed greenhouse approximately 20 feet away. 110 Though [t]he greenhouse
was covered by corrugated roofing panels," two of those panels were missing, resulting in the
ability to see into the greenhouse from the air.111 An officer flew over the property in a helicopter
at a height of 400 feet. 112 Based upon this and other information, a search warrant was
obtained, a search was conducted, and marijuana plants were seized. 113 The plurality, Justice
White joined by three other Justices, began with the notion from Katz that the police may
lawfully observe what the public may see. 114 Because a member of the public could look into
the greenhouse from the air without violating a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulation,
law enforcement could do the same. 115 The plurality also indicated that there was nothing in the
record to indicate that helicopters flying at 400 feet were so rare as to substantiate Riley's claim
that he could not have anticipated the observation-a failure of proof. 116 Finally, the plurality
held "no intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed, and
there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury." 117
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment finding that there was no objective
expectation of privacy by Riley in the greenhouse.1 18 However, the Justice criticized the plurality
in relying too heavily on whether a FAA regulation had been violated. 119 Justice O'Connor
framed the issue as "whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which
members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley's expectation of privacy from
aerial observation was not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 120 The
question is one of frequency and expectation. The burden must necessarily be on the
defendant to prove that his expectation of privacy is a reasonable one that society is willing to
protect. 121
Justice Brennan, joined by two other Justices, filed a dissent. 122 The dissent reformulated
the test as "whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to
go unregulated by constitutional constraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to
citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open

109 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (plurality opinion).
i

10

id. at 448.

Id.

i
112

Id.

13

1 Id. at 449.
114 Id. at 449-50.
i

15

/d. at 450-51.
6 Id. at 451-52.
17
Id. at 452.

1

i

18

Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Id.
Id. at 454 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Id. at 455; see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) ("Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to
require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant
evidence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim
of an invasion of privacy."); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
122 Riley, 488 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119

120
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society." 123 The dissent would frame the question whether the public's observation was "so
commonplace" that the expectation of privacy could not be considered reasonable. 124 This
dissent would place the burden on the government who has greater access to information
concerning the frequency of flights. 125
Justice Blackmun also filed a dissent. 126 The Justice pointed out that five Justices (JJ.
O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun) agreed that the question was an
objective expectation of privacy that could in large part be measured by frequency of
conduct. 12 7 More particularly, the question is whether that form of conduct by "nonpolice" was
sufficiently frequent. 128 Justice Blackmun would place the burden of proving frequency on the
government. 129
The issue in Jones could have been determined by gauging the frequency of conduct.
The solution to the problem depends upon how the issue is framed. If the issue is how often "nonpolice" place items on a private automobile, the answer may well be that things are placed on
automobiles all the time - flyers, business cards and the like. Because a "search" is a sensing into
a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no "search" when an item is placed on an
automobile. Because a "seizure" is an interruption or interception of a legitimate expectation of
privacy, there is no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes by the mere placement of an item
on an automobile.
However, if the issue is how often "non-police" place GPS monitoring devices on a
private automobile and then monitor the location of that automobile, the answer is, almost
never. Gauging the legitimate expectation of privacy by frequency under this framing of the
issue would result in a determination that there has been an intrusion or interruption of a Fourth
Amendment right to privacy.
VIII.

CONCLUSION: A SEIZURE SEARCHING FOR A PRINCIPLE

The Jones case protects against the placement of a GPS monitor on a private vehicle
without a warrant or some level of suspicion. 130 The government in Jones argued that even if
there was a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, it was reasonable, and that
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion was sufficient to justify the intrusion. 131 The Court,
however, withheld consideration of these arguments because they had not been raised in the
lower courts. 132
Thus, it remains unanswered whether something less than a warrant is sufficient to justify
the GPS placement and monitoring. The government's position will play out in the lower courts,
where GPS monitoring performed without a warrant pre-Jones will be litigated. Undoubtedly, the
prosecution will seek to justify the monitoring by arguing that law enforcement had reasonable
suspicion or probable cause.
The Court may have well enough dealt with the placement of a GPS monitoring device
on an automobile by reintroducing the invasion of a possessory interest concept, but it certainly
Id. (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
(1974)).
24
1 Id. at 460.
125 Id. at 465-66.
26
1 Id. at 467.
123

REV.

349, 403

127 Id.
128

Id. at 467-68.

129

Id. at 468.
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
Id. at 954.

130
131

I32 Id.
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has not dealt with the problems created by, for example, cell phones, emails, texts, tracking of
websites visited on a computer, tracking of grocery purchases, closed-circuit television video
monitoring, toll road collection devices, GPS monitors installed with automobiles when they are
manufactured, pharmacy purchases by seller cards, or purchases made by online retailers.
Those types of invasions do not involve any type of trespass and harken back to the 0/mstead
reasoning that these invasions do not involve the "person, house, papers, or effects" of a citizen
and are, therefore, not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 133 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor in her
concurrence in Jones stated that the rule relating to a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties must be reviewed and reformulated:
"This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks." 134
The majority and the two concurrences in Jones do not provide a workable principle for
the Fourth Amendment when it comes to digital technology. While answering the issue of
whether the attachment or monitoring of GPS is a search or seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes, the Court did not answer whether a warrant or some lesser reasonable search based
upon probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify the invasion. Just as much as
Quon disappointed in assuming but not resolving the question of whether there was a legitimate
expectation of privacy in texting, 135 so Jones disappoints in failing to develop a principled rule
for the Fourth Amendment in the digital age.
It took the Supreme Court forty years, from 0/mstead to Katz, to expand its notion of
privacy to include conversations on the telephone. We can only hope it will not take them so
long to fully confront the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in our rapidly advancing digital
age.

133
134

135

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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